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The Pirate Party of Germany (PPG) and the Italian 5-Star Movement (5SM) are two digital movement 
parties that share several ideological features, including their roots in anti-establishment movements, 
their refusal to position themselves on the Left-Right spectrum, and their belief that the Internet 
increases the capacity of ordinary citizens for self-government and self-representation. To this end, 
both parties have adopted online participation platforms, which allow their members to contribute to 
the development of the party program, vote on strategic decisions, and propose policy initiatives. Given 
these affinities and given that both parties begun their political ascendancy in the same years, their 
antipodal political destinies—ascendency to power for the 5SM, downfall for the PPG—are all the 
more striking. This article accounts for this divergence by showing how the technopopulist orientation 
of both parties conceals in fact radically different conceptions of political participation and internal 
party democracy. To this end, it considers the role that different technopolitical cultures have played 
in shaping the organization of these two parties in their early stages, and how the subsequent adoption 
and use of online participation platforms has led to internal strife and bitter disputes within the PPG 
and increasing centralization within the 5SM.   
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The Pirate Party of Germany and the Italian Five Star Movement are two movement parties (Kitschelt 
2006; Della Porta et al. 2017), cyber-parties or digital parties (Margetts 2006; Gerbaudo 2018) that 
share several ideological and organizational features. Ideologically, both parties have roots in anti-
establishment movements, refuse to position themselves on the Left-Right spectrum, and believe that 
the Internet increases the capacity of ordinary citizens for self-representation. To this end, both parties 
have adopted online participation platforms that allow their members to contribute to the development 
of the party program, vote on strategic decisions, and propose policy initiatives.  
Given these affinities and given that both parties begun their political ascendancy in the late 
2000s, their antipodal political destinies—ascendency to power for the Five Star Movement, downfall 
for the Pirate Party—are all the more striking. Although multiple causes have contributed to determine 
this divergence, there is little doubt that the Pirate Party of Germany (from now on PPG) imploded 
because it was unable to contain internal factionalism, which ended up undermining party unity and 
credibility in the public eye (Koschmieder 2015). In contrast, the centralized organization of the Five 
Star Movement (from now on 5SM) has allowed its leadership to marginalize internal dissent while 
minimizing its potentially negative impact at the ballot box. To be sure, the success of movement 
parties should not be assessed only in electoral terms. The scholarship on movement parties has in fact 
shown how left-libertarian parties such as the German Greens often put constituency representation 
above electoral performance (Kitschelt 1989; Poguntke 1993). Because post-1970s movement parties 
were tied to new social movements constituency representation translated in a commitment to 
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horizontal organizational principles such as “collective and amateur leadership, imperative mandate, 
rotation, open access to meetings, and gender parity” (Della Porta et al. 2017: 19). After the first 
electoral successes, however, such commitment came to collide with the pursuit of cabinet positions 
aimed at obtaining substantive policy changes (Kitschelt 2006: 288).  
Digital movement parties such as the PPG and the 5SM have inherited several contradictions 
highlighted by the movement party literature. However, these parties also face new organizational 
challenges such as the need of distinguishing between online supporters and actual party members, 
translating online participation into effective decision-making, and defining the scope of digital 
platforms vis-à-vis traditional party organisms. Indeed, if the PPG and the 5SM share the 
“technopopulist” belief that digital participation is key to popular control over elected representatives 
and a truly democratic governance (Deseriis 2017a), a closer look at their internal organization reveals 
a significant variation in the powers afforded to ordinary members via online platforms. The purpose 
of this article is to assess such variation by illuminating the gap between the ideology of both parties 
and their actual organizational practices. Although scholars have fruitfully contrasted the participatory 
rhetoric of the 5SM to its lack of internal democracy (Treré and Barassi 2015), they have rarely 
considered the role that different technopolitical cultures play in shaping the organization of digital 
movement parties. This article begins to fill this gap by considering how the technopolitical cultures 
of the PPG and the 5SM have informed the conception and function of the participation platforms 
within both parties, and how the deployment and use of these platforms has in turn affected their 
internal organization.   
 
1. Theoretical and Methodological Premise  
The article is divided in three sections. In the first section, I offer a definition of technopolitical culture 
and explore it along two dimensions: the ideological assumptions and belief system of its actors; and 
the organizational practices through which these beliefs acquire a material and social existence within 
a specific context. The second and central section of the article focuses on the participation platforms 
adopted by the two parties to empower their ordinary members. The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate how, far from being neutral tools, the online platforms LiquidFeedback (PPG) and 
Rousseau (5SM) incorporate in their design political beliefs and rational rules of procedure, which 
mold two radically different decision-making processes and two opposite conceptions of democracy. 
The third and final part of the article focuses on how the platforms have reshaped the internal decision-
making and organization of both parties and thus the technopolitical cultures from which they 
originated.  
The first section of the article relies on historical accounts and critical readings of the social 
movements and political campaigns that led to the foundation of both parties. The second section traces 
texts authored by the developers and designers of LiquidFeedback and Rousseau to key texts in 
political theory and political philosophy that have inspired their original conception and design. In the 
third section, I rely on four in-depth interviews I conducted with a former Political Director of the 
PPG, two elected representatives of the Berlin PP, and a national “superdelegate” in LiquidFeedback 
to show how the introduction of the platform ignited a conflict between the Berlin Pirates, who had 
developed a distinctive technopolitical culture around its use, and those who resisted its 
implementation at a national level. In Italy, I conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, and at two national 
meetings of the 5SM in Palermo and Rimini in 2016 and 2017. Drawing from fieldwork notes, and 
interviews with activists of local Meetup groups I show how the introduction of Rousseau has caused 
anxieties among activists over the increased centralization of power and their inability to use Rousseau 
to have their voice heard beyond the local.  
 
2. The Technopolitical Cultures of the Piratenpartei and the Movimento 5 Stelle 
In the tradition of cultural studies (Williams 1958), a technopolitical culture can be defined as a 
materialized belief system, that is, an ideology embodied and embedded in actions, practices, norms, 
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and institutions (Althusser 1971), which concerns the development and use of networked information 
systems for political participation. Whereas all technopolitical cultures share the populist belief that 
digital participation enhances the capacity of a people to govern itself (Deseriis 2017a), the 
technopolitical organization of such participation is highly dependent on context and culturally 
inflected. In this section I show how the Piratenpartei initially focused on the organization of 
campaigns against government surveillance and government censorship that touched on culturally 
sensitive issues in Germany. In Italy, the foundation of the Movimento 5 Stelle was instead strictly 
connected to mass mobilizations against political corruption launched by the blog of Italian comedian 
Beppe Grillo that deeply resonated with the Italians’ culture of suspicion towards the political class. 
As we will see, while the anti-censorship campaigns of the PPG ended up informing a decentralized 
and ideally leaderless party organization, the Beppe Grillo blog became the hub of a highly centralized 
national network.  
 
2.1. Foundation and Early Years of the Piratenpartei  
The Piratenpartei was founded in September 2006 as a single-issue party devoted to Internet freedom, 
understood both as free access to information and privacy protection (Löblich and Wendelin, 2012). 
The incorporation and denomination of the PPG was certainly inspired by its Swedish predecessor, the 
Piratpartiet, which had been founded in January 2006 and had quickly gained popularity after the 
Swedish police seized the servers of The Pirate Bay, at the time the largest file-sharing website in the 
world (Falkvinge, 2013; Bukart, 2010). Whereas the Piratepartiet’s program centered on copyright 
reform, the PPG had a stricter focus on privacy protection against government surveillance and 
censorship. To be sure, both the Piratpartiet and the Piratenpartei opposed the implementation of the 
European Directive on data retention (2006/24/EC), which requires Internet Service Providers and 
telephone companies to store data about their customers for six months and hand them over to the 
authorities for investigative purposes. But this campaign acquired a higher significance in Germany, 
where the corresponding national law was consistently challenged in court until the German 
constitutional court declared it unconstitutional in 2010.  
Although private corporations also engage in data mining and consumer surveillance 
(Andrejevic 2007), it has been noted that German ICT policy activists primarily focus on state 
surveillance (Löblich and Wendelin, 2012). This is a culturally sensitive issue in Germany, which is 
associated to the German political past, and in particular to the vast surveillance apparatus deployed 
during the Nazi period and after World War II in the GDR (Löblich and Wendelin, 2012: 907). Surely, 
the need of building a political opposition to the directive on data retention contributed to the 
foundation of the PPG. At the same time, it should be noted that other civil society organizations such 
as the Working Group on Data Retention (AK Stock)—which had been founded in December 2005 
for the same purpose—the association for civil rights and data protection FoeBuD, and the Chaos 
Computer Club (the largest European association of hackers) were well-equipped to conduct this 
campaign both in the courts and on the media.  
Certainly, the PPG did not take a leading role in the opposition to the directive and did not see 
a significant increase of its membership base until mid-2009, when the then Minister for Family Affairs 
Ursula von der Leyden proposed a legislative initiative to block access to child pornography websites 
at the ISP level. The proposal sparked #zensursula (a portmanteau for “Ursula the censor”), a 
grassroots campaign against Internet filtering that organized protests in several German cities, 
including a 25,000-strong in Berlin, and collected over 130,000 signatures against the proposed 
legislation. Because some of the Zensursula organizers were also members of the PPG, the party 
directly benefited from its political success, with membership figures rising from 1,000 to 11,000 by 
the end of 2009 (Piratenpartei Wiki). The campaign turned the PPG into the main political referent for 
a loose network of associations operating in the field of Internet freedom and anti-censorship 
initiatives, including the aforementioned AK Stock, FoeBuD, and CCC, as well as the German Big 
Brother Awards, the Invisible Internet Project (I2P), websites such as Gulli.com and Wikileaks 
(Neumann 2011: 24), and the hacktivist group Anonymous. 
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It is worth noting that while the PPG became a political referent for these groups, it did not 
organize them in a centralized fashion. The Pirates retained in fact a strong ethical commitment to self-
directed, decentralized, and collaborative modes of engagement whose roots lie in the hacker ethic 
(Levy 1984; Himanen 2001), the Free Software movement (Kelty 2008; Söderberg 2008), the media-
savvy components of the Global Justice Movement (Juris 2008), and the hybrid democratic governance 
of large FOSS projects such as the Debian distribution (Coleman 2013: 126-140). With these 
movements, the Pirates shared a culture of suspicion towards any form of centralization and authority, 
which laid its roots in the technolibertarianism of the 1990s (Barbrook and Cameron 1996; Turner 
2006). With hackers and geeks the Pirates also shared the belief that a network can govern itself, and 
that provided with the right tools, any organization can implement radically democratic forms of 
governance (Deseriis, 2017a). 
Since 2007, a group of Berlin Pirates had been discussing the possibility of developing 
software that would support Liquid Democracy, or delegative democracy by proxy voting, an 
emerging model of participatory democracy that combines direct democracy and representative 
democracy with the stated objective of overcoming the limitations of both (Mühlbauer and Huwald 
2007). Although this debate had been mostly speculative and exploratory, the sudden increase in 
membership sparked by the Zensursula campaign multiplied the requests for an effective decision-
making tool within the PPG. To fulfill this need, in the fall of 2009, the Public Software Group, a 
Berlin-based group of system developers, released LiquidFeedback, which is considered the first 
software implementation of Liquid Democracy. 
In sum, the movement cultures that inform the foundation of the PPG stem from two distinct, 
but partly overlapping, milieus: a German ICT activist milieu, which is culturally sensitive to 
government surveillance and that came together in the organization of the Zensursula campaign; and 
the technical culture of FOSS programmers, whose growing politicization was part of a wider 
transnational tendency vis-à-vis increasingly restrictive IP laws (Coleman 2013; Adler 2018). As we 
will see, these two milieus shared a “proceduralist” view of political participation and democracy, 
which ended up colliding with the institutional governance of the PPG. 
 
2.2. Incubation and Foundation of the 5SM 
If the Pirates see networked participation as an antidote to the centralization of power, the Internet 
plays a distinctively different role in the initial conception and foundation of the 5SM. Prior to its 
incorporation as a “non-party” in October 2009, the 5SM was a mass movement of public opinion that 
coalesced around the figure of Beppe Grillo—a comedian whose biography and artistic trajectory 
embodies in many ways the deep distrust Italians harbor towards the political class. In 2005, Grillo 
launched beppegrillo.it, which quickly became one of the most visited and influential blogs in the 
world (Mello 2013). Using the blog as a digital extension of his theater shows, Grillo launched his first 
public initiatives against the corruption of the political class and of the Italian media system  (Oggiano 
2012: 94-119). He also kept publishing articles on a wide range of issues including recycling, clean 
energy, the degrowth movement, micro-credit and monetary sovereignty, and open source software—
thereby addressing a much wider audience than the PPG.  
Because the blog soon proved to be an inadequate medium for organizational purposes, 
Gianroberto Casaleggio, the administrator of beppegrillo.it and CEO of the web marketing company 
Casaleggio Associati, launched the first Friends of Beppe Grillo (from now on FBG) Meetup group in 
June 2005. In the ensuing months, dozens and then hundreds of FBG Meetup groups sprung up around 
the country. The need of coordinating the activities of the FBG groups led in November 2006 to the 
creation of the Meetup 280, a national discussion group for Meetup organizers originally focusing on 
topics such as participatory budgeting, digital direct democracy, degrowth, and open source software. 
By 2007, the Meetup 280 had turned into an organizational hub for an emerging network of local civic 
lists (liste civiche), and for an embryonic attempt to draft a national agenda for the nascent Movement 
from below (Ceri and Veltri, 2017: 43-49). The relative autonomy of the Meetups from the blog 
continued until the official presentation of the 5SM at the Teatro Smeraldo in Milan in October 2009. 
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On this occasion, it became apparent that Grillo and Casaleggio had no intention of letting the Meetup 
280 contribute to the 5SM’s political program, thus sidelining the organizers’ attempt at building a 
decentralized national network (Ceri and Veltri, 83-90).  
The incorporation of the 5SM engendered instead Grillo and Casaleggio’s vision of a “non-
party,” that is, of a Movement without intermediary bodies and ruling organisms whose members 
would entertain an ostensibly direct relationship with their representatives via the Internet (Casaleggio 
and Grillo 2011; Casaleggio 2013). This techno-utopian vision was articulated in the “non-statute” of 
the 5SM, a short document that laid out the basic rules of the nascent organization and which promised 
to “recognize to the totality of the Network users the role of government and orientation ordinarily 
attributed to the few” (Movimento 5 Stelle 2016: 3). In order to support such broad participation, 
however, the 5SM needed a software that would incorporate decision-making functionalities, which 
were not available neither in the Meetup platform nor in the Beppe Grillo blog.  
The gap between the programmatic statements and the practice became evident when the 5SM 
managed to win a stunning 25.5% of the vote at the general elections of February 2013. Growing 
impatient at the lack of tools that would allow members shape the direction of the (non-)party, in the 
spring of 2013 a group of 5SM programmers and elected representatives in the Lazio region developed 
Parelon, a decision-making software based on LiquidFeedback, with the goal of introducing it in 
municipal and regional administrations. It is here that the trajectory of the 5SM and of the PPG 
intersected if only for a short moment. In fact, as soon as the activists announced the release of Parelon, 
Grillo clarified that the only recognized platform of the 5SM would be the new “Sistema Operativo” 
(later to be renamed Rousseau), which was eventually released in October 2013 (Grillo 2013). Thus, 
in this circumstance, the party leadership marginalized, once again, the technopolitical wing of the 
party retaining a tight control over the internal decision-making tools and procedures. 
In sum, the movement cultures that inspire the birth of the 5SM are thematically more 
diversified than those of the PPG, and can be divided into two main strands: 1) a large movement of 
public opinion against political corruption that is directly mobilized by Beppe Grillo throguh his shows 
and blog; and 2) a smaller activist base whose political practices are connected to local 
environmentalism and other civic initiatives. On an organizational level, these two strands assume two 
distinct forms: a mass public of followers, which materializes on a daily basis in the comments section 
of beppegrillo.it and, sporadically, via large protest events organized by the comedian; and a networked 
activist base that relies on the Meetup platform to organize locally while also trying to build a national 
network via the Meetup 280. While the latter had the vision of a decentralized networked party, it did 
not hold the political power to build it. As we will see, the participation platform Rousseau would 
become the main instrument for implementing a vision of digital (direct) democracy based on 
preference aggregation.  
 
3. Different Conceptions of Democracy Embedded in LiquidFeedback and Rousseau  
As noted, the introduction of participation platforms such as LiquidFeedback (PPG) and Rousseau 
(5SM) had a significant impact on the internal decision-making processes of both parties. Indeed, far 
from being neutral tools, LiquidFeedback and Rousseau incorporate a range of political beliefs, design 
codes, and rational rules of procedure, which mold specific and emerging conceptions of democracy. 
LiquidFeedback is in fact the first working implementation of liquid democracy—or delegative 
democracy by proxy voting. Rousseau engenders instead a form of direct parliamentarianism 
(Deseriis 2017b). In this section I show how liquid democracy lays its roots in public choice theory, 
which frames the public interest as the aggregate choice of utility-maximizing individuals. In contrast, 
the Rousseau platform is inspired to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of the general will, which places 
the public interest above the particular wills of private individuals. 
 
3.1. The Roots of LiquidFeedback in Public Choice Theory 
Developed in 2009 by the Public Software Group, a Berlin-based group of four open source system 
developers, LQFB is an open source application that allows users to propose, discuss, amend, and vote 
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on civic and political initiatives. As compared to other decision-making software, LQFB’s defining 
feature is that the software supports an advanced specialization of labor by allowing users delegate 
their vote to other users. Those who receive proxies, or delegations, can in turn transfer them to other 
users facilitating the emergence of chains of trust. Such trust, however, is not a blank check as 
delegators can revoke their proxy and vote directly at any given moment. Because of this reversibility 
or “liquidity” of the decision-making process, LQFB is the first  implementation of Liquid Democracy 
(from now on LD), a model of delegative democracy whose modern origins have been traced back to 
Lewis Carroll’s The Principles of Parliamentary Representation.  
In this text, the English author envisioned a voting system whereby representatives who 
receive more popular votes than necessary to be elected, can transfer their extra-votes to unelected 
candidates so as to reduce the number of unrepresented voters (Carroll, 1884). During the twentieth 
century, various authors continued to theorize different models of delegative democracy (for a 
summary of this debate, see Jabbusch, 2011; Green-Armytage, 2015; Behrens 2017). Here I will just 
pause on a significant moment in the LD genealogy—namely, the encounter between public choice 
theory and delegative democracy. In 1967, public choice theorist and mathematician Gordon Tullock 
envisioned a system of political representation where each representative would have a voting power 
exactly proportional to the number of votes received (Tullock 1967: 144-157). Two years later, James 
C. Miller III developed Tullock’s proposal envisioning the possibility for citizens to vote directly on 
any given law from their computers, or to send a delegate to Congress for the issue at hand, thereby 
decoupling political representation from party affiliation and fixed-term appointments (Miller 1969).  
It is certainly no accident that public choice theorists developed an interest in delegative 
democracy. As an economic, market-based theory of politics, public choice analyzes collective 
decision making as the aggregate choice of utility-maximizing individuals (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962: 43-44). As such, it frames the public interest as the outcome rather than the source of an ongoing 
deal-making activity whereby voters, public servants, and politicians achieve mutual gains by 
resolving conflicts through exchange. This “politics-as-exchange” transforms the relative intensity of 
individual preferences into the basis of a voluntary exchange from which all parties can benefit (Brennan 
2012). From this angle, far from epitomizing a corruption in the political process, the institutional 
practice of logrolling—the exchange of support or favors among representatives—is “a dynamic 
process of adjustment and compromise wherein preferences of different intensities over different 
issues can be linked though trade” (Thrasher and Gaus, 2017: 3-4).  
Delegative democracy by proxy voting and LD extend this process to the social body by 
allowing ordinary voters to engage in negotiations that are ordinarily the purview of elected 
representatives. Indeed, under a delegation-based system, voters do not need to entrust a bloc of 
representatives, usually under the control of a single party, with the task of representing them in toto. 
Instead, they can distribute their preferences among a variable number of delegates so as to increase 
their chances of maximizing their net benefit. LQFB foregrounds this efficient allocation of resources 
by allowing users to transfer proxies to trustees for a single initiative, subject area, or all issues 
(Behrens et al. 2014: 26). Indeed, the software is designed to encourage politics-as-exchange on four 
distinct levels, which correspond to the four phases of the decision-making process: admission, 
discussion, verification, and voting (Behrens et al., 66-69).  
First, because proposals need to pass an initial support threshold, proxy holders with a high 
voting weight have significant agenda-setting power, and their support is highly sought in the 
admission phase. Second, when competing proposals enter the discussion phase, potential supporters 
can make suggestions for amendment, and either confirm or withdraw their support depending on the 
proponent’s response. Third, in the verification phase, the supporters whose suggestions have been 
rejected can introduce an alternative initiative, which may incorporate the proposed amendments. 
Finally, in the voting phase, proxy holders can decide either to vote directly or to transfer their voting 
weight (that is, all received proxies plus their personal vote) to other trustees. This transitive property 
is conducive to the creation of “chains of delegations” whereby intermediate proxy holders can have 
a significant bargaining power in determining the final outcome of a decision and can therefore act as 
	
7	
checks on the power of those who hold the highest number of proxies at the end of the chain (Behrens 
et al., 33). 
In sum, as the first working implementation of LD, LQFB did not merely satisfy the need of 
a rapidly growing party for a distributed and scalable decision-making tool. Rather, by encoding a 
rationalist vision of democracy into a highly formalized design, LQFB shaped some internal party 
processes while generating an emerging technopolitical culture around its use. Because LQFB’s most 
disruptive affordance is its capacity to turn every participant into a potential delegate (and vice versa) 
the Berlin Pirates proposed to use the software as the equivalent to a permanent party convention at a 
national level so as to correct the democratic deficits of large assemblies of party members 
(Koschmieder 2015). Such proposal, however, met the resistance of the Bavarian Pirates and of the 
party leadership, who feared that skilled LQFB users would have an undue advantage over non-skilled 
users. At the same time, the so-called “Liquid Wars” not only opposed users and non-users of the 
software but also invested the pro-LQFB camp. In particular, as we will see, native software features 
such as the open ballot system and transitive delegations caused anxieties over the creation of a 
database of politically sensitive opinions, and the concentration of power in the hands of few 
“superdelegates,” respectively. 
 
3.2. Rousseau and the Theory of the General Will 
As compared to LQFB, Rousseau is not a generic open source software that can be adapted to many 
different uses and circumstances, but a proprietary participation platform that has been designed in 
house by the Casaleggio Associati to serve the needs of a rapidly growing party. As such, the platform 
functionalities are predefined and currently divided into 12 distinct sections, or areas. Five of these 
areas—Lex Parliament, Lex Europe, Lex Region, Lex Members, and Lex Members Region—are 
dedicated to lawmaking; the areas Activism and Call to Action are dedicated to the publicization of 
grassroots initiatives; Sharing supports the exchange of administrative acts among city and regional 
councillors; E-learning provides online courses to aspiring 5SM candidates; Open Cities allows 
candidate mayors to prepare their own lists online; and the areas Fundraising and Shield of the Net are 
dedicated to fundraising and legal support of party members, respectively. Last, but not least, a Vote 
functionality is activated any time 5SM members are called to exercise their voting rights.  
Even though Rousseau has been designed to support a preexisting organization, the platform 
incorporates a specific vision of democracy and political participation, which is all the more significant 
given that the “non-statute” that normed the foundation of the Movement disavows “the mediation of 
directive or representative organisms” within the party (Movimento 5 Stelle 2016: 3). Further, the 5SM 
leadership explicitly bars the formation of intermediary bodies such as regional associations of 
Meetups (Fico and Di Battista 2015) so as to prevent the formation of internal factions and strands. 
This anti-representational stance is also clearly articulated in the writings and programmatic statements 
of the two co-founders of the 5SM, who have have repeatedly criticized the free mandate, advocating 
for the introduction of direct democracy measures such as online referendums, citizen initiatives, and 
recall ballots (Casaleggio and Grillo 2011; Casaleggio et al. 2013). 
Given this conception of political representation, it is no surprise that Rousseau is named after 
the Swiss philosopher of The Social Contract. In this text, Rousseau famously argued that sovereign 
power, as an indivisible expression of the citizens’ “general will,” cannot be mediated by 
representatives. “Every law which the citizens have not ratified is invalid; it is not a law,” he wrote 
(Rousseau 1998: 96). But if the general will cannot be represented, it can be revealed to the body 
politic “through the counting of the votes” (Rousseau, 108). Regardless of whether the general will is 
expressed unanimously or through majority voting, it embodies the common interest against the 
particular wills of private individuals. For this reason, the citizen who votes with the minority should 
immediately consider his vote as nothing more than personal opinion. If not, “long discussions, 
dissensions, and uproar proclaim the ascendancy of private interests and the decline of the state” 
(Rousseau, 107). 
The theory of the general will may help explain why binding consultations play a central role 
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in the 5SM platform and why “long discussions” or “dissensions” are completely absent from it. From 
December 2012 through December 2017, Rousseau hosted 65 online ballots, ranging from several 
online primaries to the ratification of the electoral program to the expulsion of dissenting MPs to the 
positioning of the parliamentary group on key policy issues (Mosca 2018). Particularly significant are 
the ballots that led in 2013 to the expulsion of several MPs accused of violating the Code of Conduct 
of the parliamentary groups. The ballots were announced on beppegrillo.it and subsequently ratified 
by the assembly of the members via Rousseau. The plebiscitarian nature of the consultations is evident 
from the fact that the blog represented only the point of view of the party leadership while ignoring 
that of the MPs. Even in this case, however, a Rousseaun conception of sovereign power may justify 
this course of action insofar as The Social Contract attributes to the government (embodied here by 
the 5SM leadership) the power to enact the general will and thus to represent the totality of the body 
politic (Rousseau, 97). 
The fact that Rousseau enforces a politics of unity is also evident from the ostensible lack of 
features that may allow members to debate policy matters. The only areas in which users can provide 
a limited feedback are Lex Europe, Lex Parliament and Lex Region. Here 5SM representatives open 
their draft legislation for comment for a period of 60 days before introducing it into parliament. 
However, because these areas do not feature threaded comments, members can provide feedback to 
their representative but not to other members. Further, representatives remain free to adopt “the most 
useful comments” while providing a very limited rationale for their choices, if any (Deseriis 2017b; 
Mosca 2018). The lack of deliberative tools is particularly striking in Lex Members, the direct 
legislation area of Rousseau. Here members can upload a proposal for a bill of law, read and vote on 
other members’ proposals, but cannot collectively debate or amend the proposals.  
In sum, contrary to LQFB, which frames politics as a form of exchange between utility-
maximizing individuals, Rousseau frames politics from the point of view of the general interest. On 
the one hand, the general interest of the 5SM community is “revealed” through binding consultations. 
On the other hand, the enforcement of such will is guaranteed by the party leadership and the elected 
representatives who retain the power to decide the subject and timing of the consultations, and 
introduce the vast majority of the bills on Lex. Although the ample autonomy of 5SM representatives 
is in stark contrast with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s critique of political representation, the 5SM 
leadership considers the representative as nothing more than a spokesperson (portavoce) of the 5SM 
community, whose internal differences are denied or minimized. In this respect, the platform is the 
locus where representatives are first authorized by the party members (via the online primaries) and 
then made accountable to the party base by reporting their legislative initiatives. If this vertical 
relationship between members and representatives is a form of direct parliamentarianism (Deseriis 
2017b), such form is predicated upon the rigid separation of deliberation, which remains a prerogative 
of representatives, from the decisional moment, which is opened up to the whole party in the simplified 
form of preference aggregation.   
 
4. The Technopolitical Reconfiguration of the PPG and the 5SM 
In this final section, I will show how the introduction of LQFB and Rousseau contributed to reshape 
the technopolitical cultures and the internal decision-making processes of both parties. Whereas both 
platforms were designed to allow ordinary party members to influence high-level decisions, their 
actual introduction and use led to divergent results: bitter factional disputes in the PPG and 
consolidation of centralized management in the 5SM.  
 
4.1. The Impact of LQFB on the Internal Organization of the PPG 
As noted, Berlin was the breeding ground for LD in Germany and LQFB was developed in Berlin. In 
2010-11, the Berlin PP successfully used the software to develop the program for the state elections of 
September 2011, where the party won 8.9% of the vote and 15 parliament seats, paving the way for 
similar successes in three subsequent state elections. Galvanized by the electoral successes and with 
membership figures rising to almost 35,000 members in 2012 (Piratenpartei Wiki), the advocates of 
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LQFB tried to scale the use of the software from the state level to the federal level, proposing to replace 
the party convention with a ständige Mitgliederversammlung (SMV), a standing general meeting to be 
permanently held online. As noted, the proposal met the opposition of some PPG leaders and especially 
of the Bavarian branch of the party, which feared that the Berlin Pirates could seize control of the party 
because of their advanced skills in using the software.  
Capitalizing on various critiques of LQFB, in 2012 the Bavarian Pirates developed a fork of 
LQFB called PirateFeedback, which allows users to list five delegates in order of preference and does 
not allow trustees to pass delegations on. Even though the software had a limited use within the 
Bavarian PP its very development signaled that the two most powerful branches of the party were 
unable to agree on common decision-making tools and protocols. The conflict became public at the 
Neumarkt convention in May 2013, when the Bavarian Pirates blocked the attempt of the Berlin Pirates 
to obtain a supermajority to change the party statute and introduce the SMV. Here the liquid wars 
reached a point of non-return. Personal animosity among various party leaders amplified by social 
media sealed the destiny of the party, which failed to enter the Bundestag in September 2013, and 
faded out of the German political landscape as quickly as it had appeared.  
Certainly, the meteoric rise and fall of the Piratenpartei can be explained with the lack of an 
authoritative leadership capable of mediating between the party branches at the federal level. At the 
same time, the lack of leadership was not accidental for a party whose young members had a strong 
anti-elitist attitude not only towards career politicians but also towards “any of their competent 
members who would get to a certain high position” (Weisband interview, 2017). This anti-political 
attitude invested political directors, members of the party Board, and even those who were in charge 
of implementing LQFB at a national level or who held a high number of delegations in LQFB.  
Indeed, the transitive delegation feature of LQFB is conducive to the formation of power-law 
distributions (Barabási 2002), that is, to the concentration of power in the hands of few 
“superdelegates.” Although superdelegates such as Martin Haase stress that their power was always 
subject to scrutiny and thus easily reversible, they also note that “an informal power can be very 
powerful” as the software was often used to prepare motions that were eventually approved at the party 
convention (Haase interview, 2016). It was only a matter of time before this factual influence collided 
with the formal power of the Board, which was defeated by Haase in several circumstances in spite of 
the fact that he had no formal appointments within the party.  
The second software feature that proved to be highly controversial is the open ballot system. 
Whereas the software developers had implemented this feature to ensure the verifiability of the vote 
(Behrens et al., 2014: 39-57), some Berlin Pirates argued that the transparency of LQFB posed a threat 
to their privacy and begun using pseudonymous names. This ignited a whole dispute on the verifiability 
of pseudonymous accounts, which was initially solved by allowing pseudonymous users to identify 
themselves at local Pirate meetings (Reinhardt interview, 2016). But the dispute had political and 
philosophical implications that went beyond the privacy of individual users. Because a LQFB user can 
both transfer and receive delegations, she can be simultaneously delegator and trustee. This raises in 
turn the question of whether trustees have a right to privacy, given that voting on behalf of someone 
implies a responsibility that voting for oneself does not (Haase interview, 2016).  
Thus, in blurring the boundaries between participation and delegation, direct democracy and 
representative democracy, the LQFB system displays emergent properties that put into crisis notions 
of privacy and accountability based on existing systems of governance. Further, the actual use of the 
software raised doubts and anxieties over the concentration of power in few hands, and the creation of 
a database of politically sensitive opinions. As we have seen, these anxieties were consistent with the 
technopolitical culture of the Piratenpartei, which stemmed from anti-censorship and anti-surveillance 
campaigns, and valued leaderless and collaborative forms of governance. Thus it is no surprise that 
some of the Pirates who derived their power from the formal governance structure of the party 
exploited these anxieties to block the attempt to replace this governance with the LQFB-powered SVM 
(Delius interview, 2016).  
In this respect, it is certainly ironic that a piece of software that was introduced with the 
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ostensible goal of supporting networked self-governance—a goal that found a wide ideological support 
within the party—ended up becoming the main obstacle to it. At the same time, LQFB’s emphasis on 
the autonomy and sovereignty of individual users may point to an irreducible contradiction in all digital 
politics—namely, the difficulty of striking a balance between online participation, which tends to 
empower individuals, and a key institution of representative democracy such as the political party, 
which is meant to express and organize the will of a collective. 
 
4.2. The Impact of Rousseau on the Internal Organization of the 5SM 
If the introduction of LQFB generated a distinctive technopolitical practice around its use, the same 
cannot be said of Rousseau. Because the platform does not support group communication, and users 
can only perform individualized tasks, the platform has not generated a technopolitical community and 
an internal debate about its potential and limitations. This does not mean, however, that the platform 
has not changed the relationship between ordinary party members, party activists, and party leaders.  
As noted, the binding vote is the most important functionality of Rousseau both at the design 
level (as it is meant to reveal the general will of the 5SM community) and at the level of its actual 
usage, as 5SM members use Rousseau mostly for voting (Sabatini 2018). However, because the party 
leadership controls both the subject and the timing of the consultations, it can use them strategically 
to strengthen its own position. This is not an entirely new practice as many European parties have been 
holding internal consultations, mostly via postal ballots, at least since the 1980s. It has been noted that 
while these consultations have the ostensible goal of empowering the general membership, they can 
also be used to silence or weaken internal dissent. This is because “the ‘ordinary’ members… are at 
once more docile and more likely to endorse the policies (and candidates) proposed by the party 
leadership and by the party in public office” vis-à-vis the party activists, who are usually more critical 
of the leadership (Katz and Mair 1980: 14).   
My own interactions with 5SM activists confirm this insight. During fieldwork I conducted in 
Rome, Milan, and at two national meetings of the 5SM in Palermo and Rimini in 2016-2017 5SM 
activists often voiced their concerns about the lack of deliberative tools within the platform, the limited 
time allowed for voting, the impossibility of cooperating with other members via Rousseau, and the 
centralized nature of the platform. For example, one long-running organizer of a Meetup group in 
Rome told me that the area Call to Action “now hosts many events that were previously accessible 
only if you were a member of a Meetup group or took the time to visit the pages of each Meetup. On 
Rousseau it is much easier for them [the party leadership] to control us because the events are all 
available in one page” (Interview with Meetup organizer, 2017). Similarly, at the Rimini National 
Meeting of 2017 an activist from Cupra Marittima, a town near Naples, told me that the launch of Call 
to Action “created a problem” in her Meetup. According to her account, a young activist from the 
Cupra Meetup with whom she and other activists had a dispute, created a new event page on Call to 
Action, trying to gain legitimacy by establishing a presence for a new Meetup group on Rousseau. 
Besides reclaiming the independence of the Cupra Meetup from the party (as we have seen, FBG 
Meetup groups are not officially affiliated to the 5SM), the woman worried that Call to Action could 
“duplicate political processes,” not only in her home town, but across the nation (Fieldwork notes, 
2017). 
Thus, while 5SM members generally see Rousseau as a critical decision-making tool at a 
national level, the activists seem aware that Rousseau is unable to scale the kind of deliberative 
processes that make their participation in local activism meaningful. Indeed, two seasoned activists of 
the Milan FBG Meetup—the first FBG Meetup created in Italy—showed me how their group relies on 
a wide range of software tools to prepare and organize local events without having the need of taking 
an online vote on any of these initiatives (Interview with 5SM activists, 2017). From this angle, the 
consensus-oriented deliberative practices that drive activism at a local level seem almost at odds with 
the direct democracy model based on preference aggregation engendered by Rousseau. To be sure, the 
deliberative model and the aggregative model of direct democracy are not necessarily incompatible as 
deliberative software tools such as forums and wikis could be used in theory to support debate and 
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collaboration while voting software tools could be used for preference aggregation.  
De facto, however, in the 5SM this integration is only hypothetical as authentic deliberation 
remains either confined to the local level or to deliberation within empowered spaces. This is due to 
the fact that Rousseau rigidly separates deliberative capacity from decisional power, leaving the former 
almost exclusively in the hands of the party leadership and of elected representatives. As noted, such 
separation was already present in the original organization of the 5SM, which combined the atomized 
followers of beppegrillo.it (a mass public) with the activism of the Meetups (a networked public). By 
endowing the mass public with voting power and denying the networked public any capacity to control 
the agenda from below, Rousseau has sanctioned the subordination of networked activism to the 
atomized party member. From this angle, the decision-making model that undergirds Rousseau is more 
akin to the audience democracy of broadcast media (Manin 1997) than to the democratic innovations 
(Smith 2009) of networked media.  
Curiously, however, even when Rousseau is measured via the yardstick of preference 
aggregation its numbers fail to match the impressive electoral rise of the 5SM. Indeed, data show that 
in spite of a nominal increase in the party membership actual participation in Rousseau is constantly 
declining both in voter turnout and the average number of comments per legislative initiative (Mosca 
and Vaccari 2017; Mosca 2018). Of course, several hypotheses can be made on the root causes of this 
decline, including the institutionalization of a movement party that now privileges electoral 
performance over grassroots participation (Corbetta 2017). Nonetheless the aforementioned lack of in-
platform support for group communication prevents the development of an online community at a 
national level while relegating several deliberative processes to non-specialized platforms such as 
social messaging applications and social network sites. 
  
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that although the PPG and the 5SM share a faith in the democratic potential 
of the Internet, their technopolitical cultures have had a significantly different political weight within 
the party organization. As we have seen, the PPG technopolitical culture valued decentralization and 
individual autonomy from government surveillance and censorship. In line with this sensibility, LQFB 
entrusts individual users with several deliberative capacities—including the power to influence the 
party agenda and to allocate or receive delegations. In contrast, the 5SM was born as a mass movement 
of public opinion led by a charismatic leader, with a smaller networked activist base. Because this base 
was politically marginal the Rousseau platform engenders a politics of unity by foregrounding the 
decisional moment as the undivided expression of the 5SM’s general will.  
Thus, from a strictly procedural point of view, LQFB implements a decision-making process 
that is far more democratic and sophisticated than Rousseau. At the same time, the hurdles encountered 
by the Berlin Pirates in transforming LQFB in a permanent party convention suggest that scaling an 
online participation process from the local level to the national level can cause distrust and conflict if 
the process is not adequately socialized within different party branches. In contrast, the centralized 
deployment of Rousseau has had the undeniable political advantage of introducing simultaneously a 
standardized consultation procedure on different scales, including the possibility for users to comment 
on regional, national, and European legislation.  
To be sure, the difficulties encountered by the Pirates are also a byproduct of the peculiar 
federal structure of all German parties—something that does not pertain to the statutory organization 
of Italian parties. In this respect, this comparative analysis suggests that while a technopolitical culture 
can influence the design of a participation platform the actual deployment of the platform within a 
party is a non-linear process that is shaped by statutory regulations, internal party struggles, and wider 
sociopolitical and sociocultural differences that may exist within a nation. If such tensions were 
explicit and played out in public in the case of LiquidfFeedback, the low level of participation in 
Rousseau suggests that the platform is unable to capture several participatory processes. From this 
angle, a broader lesson to be learned here is that the analysis of non-habituated media practices such 
as the use of online participation platforms should account not only for the positively observable uses 
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of such tools but also for the forms of resistance that may emerge in response to their introduction—
some of which may be overt, and some of which may be expressed more quietly through exodus, 
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